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I. INTRODUCTION
The prison population in the United States is experiencing a period of
tremendous growth.1 Due to the inability of prison construction to keep
pace with this growth, prison facilities throughout the country have be-
come severely overcrowded.2 "The typical prison of the last third of the
* Student contributors are Elizabeth F. Edwards and Nancy G. LaGow.
1. The prison population in the United States increased 45% from 1973 to 1979. S. HR)M,
THE CORRECTIONAL SysTEMi 67 (1981)..
2. The length of sentences, the number of offenders placed on probation, and the number
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twentieth century has changed relatively little from the institutions of
150 years earlier."3 Inmates, forced to live under these conditions, have
flocked to the courts seeking relief.4 Yet, until its 1981 decision in Rhodes
v. Chapman,5 the United States Supreme Court had never reviewed a
case in which particular prison conditions were challenged as constituting
cruel and unusual punishment.
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.' The Supreme Court has said
that "the touchstone of [this amendment] is 'nothing less than the dig-
nity of man.' "'7 Interpreted in this light, the amendment prohibits much
more than physically barbarous punishment. It proscribes the infliction of
any conditions which fall below the accepted civilized standards of de-
cency and humanity.8 This comment will discuss Rhodes v. Chapman,
and in particular its holding that objective and specific evidence of un-
constitutional prison conditions be introduced prior to a court's applica-
tion of the traditional tests for finding cruel and unusual punishment.
The types of evidence which may be sufficient to establish overcrowding
as violative of the eighth amendment will be explored with emphasis
placed on evidence of the effects of overcrowding on the mental and phys-
ical health of inmates and on evidence of the deleterious effects of over-
crowding on the totality of prison conditions. Those cases in which intol-
erable prison conditions have been used in defending prisoners charged
with the crime of escape will be briefly reviewed. Finally, the potential
impact of Rhodes on prison overcrowding cases arising in Virginia will be
examined.
of inmates placed on parole also affect the numbers of prisoners confined in penal institu-
tions. Like the construction of new facilities, these factors have failed to keep pace with the
rapid growth in prison populations. Id. at 168.
3. Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation, 20 CATH.
U. L. REv. 365, 372 (1971).
4. Prisons in at least twenty-four states have been placed under court order because of
their conditions. For a list of these states and the decisions which ordered the unconstitu-
tional conditions corrected, see Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2402 n.1 (1981). More
than eight thousand cases concerning prison conditions are pending. Id. at 2402 n.2. For a
partial list of these cases, see NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
STATUS REPORT-THE COURTS AND PRISONS (1981).
5. 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981). "We consider here for the first time the limitation that the
Eighth Amendment... imposes upon the conditions in which a state may confine those
convicted of crimes." Id. at 2397-98.
6. "Excessive bail shall not be required, or excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
7. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958), quoted in Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802,
813 (D. Or. 1980).
8. 495 F. Supp. at 813.
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II. JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
A. The Evolving Definition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment
At common law, the imposition of brutal punishments for those con-
victed of heinous crimes was not prohibited.9 Hanging, burning alive, be-
heading, and "public dissection" were accepted punishments.10 The En-
glish Declaration of Rights of 1689,11 from which the eighth amendment
was derived, was intended to prevent primitive forms of punishment such
as dismemberment and crucifixion."
Initially, the eighth amendment was thought to have little use, for the
punishments which it originally protected were no longer acceptable.
13
Not until 1910 did the Supreme Court give the eighth amendment re-
newed meaning. In Weems v. United States, 4 a case involving an acces-
sory to the falsification of a public document, the convicted accessory was
sentenced to twelve-to-twenty years at hard labor with ankle and *wrist
chains and the permanent loss of his civil rights. 5 The Supreme Court
found the punishment excessive, declaring that the raison d'etre for the
eighth amendment should not be constrained by the common law's limi-
tation upon brutal penalties.16 The amendment "is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice. 17
9. Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v.
Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth
Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 900 (1977).
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1510-11 (4th ed. T. Coo-
ley & J. Andrews 1899):
Of these [permissible punishments] some are capital, which extend to the life of the
offender and consist generally in being hanged by the neck til dead; though in very
atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain or disgrace, are superadded; as, in
treason of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execution; in high treason
affecting the King's person or government, emboweling alive, beheading and quarter-
ing; and in murder, a public dissection. And, in case of any treason committed by a
female, the judgment is to be burned alive .... Some punishments consist in exile
or banishment, others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment.
Some extend to confiscation, others induce a disability. Some, though rarely, occasion
a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears, others fix a last stigma
on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or cheek.
11. Declaration of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c.2.
12. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted'" The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
13. "[T]he provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it
is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify
such atrocious conduct." Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 410, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893).
14. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
15. Id. at 358, 364; Robbins & Buser, supra note 9, at 901.
16. 217 U.S. at 370-75.
17. Id. at 378. See generally Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 635 (1966).
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Until recently, however, a "hands-off" policy of judicial intervention in
prison conditions had been followed."8 Courts felt that prison manage-
ment was beyond judicial competence and was best left to the legislative
and executive branches of government. 9 Additional justifications for this
policy included a fear of increased prisoner litigation20 and disruption of
discipline of the prisons,2 ' and, where federal courts were asked to inter-
fere with state institutions, "notions of federalism have also led to re-
straint."' 2 However, the United States Supreme Court, while recognizing
that these justifications for the "hands-off" policy have some validity, re-
cently declared that "a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any
failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in
a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends
a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge
their duty to protect constitutional rights.' 2 Thus only when the consti-
tutional rights of inmates are not infringed is the "hands-off" policy now
utilized.24
B. Tests for Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Even with the courts' increasing involvement in prison conditions, no
static test for cruel and unusual punishment has been enunciated. Be-
cause "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"'
5
18. For a discussion of the "hands-off" doctrine, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506
(1963).
19. See Crothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F.
Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally Golfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Griev-
ances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970).
20. See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tamm, J., concurring).
21. See Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally Comment,
Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The California Experience-An Empirical Study, 20
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 452 (1973).
22. Note, Overcrowding in Oklahoma's Prisons, 13 TULSA L.J. 525, 530 (1978).
23. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974).
24. The court has retained the "hands-off" policy for prison condition cases not involving
fundamental constitutional guarantees to insure that the courts do not become the primary
instrument of prison reform.
The federal courts, as we have often noted, are not equipped by experience or other-
wise to "second guess" the decisions of state legislatures and administrators in this
sensitive area except in the most extraordinary circumstances. This recognition, of
course, does not imply that a prisoner is stripped of all constitutional protection as he
passes through the prison's gates .... Rather, it "reflects no more than a healthy
sense of realism" on our part to understand that needed reforms in the area of prison
administration must come, not from the federal courts, but from those with the most
expertise in this field-prison administrators themselves.
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
25. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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tests used by the courts must be sufficiently flexible to reflect changing
public opinion regarding socially acceptable punishments.
Tests frequently employed by the courts consist of an inquiry into
whether particular prison conditions are "so bad as to be shocking to the
conscience of reasonably civilized people;"28 whether they "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain; '27 or whether they are "totally
without penological justificaton."2 s To allow for the needed flexibility,
these tests involve a great degree of judicial subjectivity, and their resolu-
tion depends in large part on the particular facts of the case. Hence, it is
not surprising that the application of these tests in prison condition suits
is often inconsistent. While the recent Supreme Court case of Rhodes v.
Chapman9 does not set forth a new test for eighth amendment chal-
lenges, it does establish more stringent evidentiary requirements in order
to prove a case of cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, a greater
consistency in the application of these traditional tests may be a result of
the Rhodes decision.
HI. Rhodes v. Chapman
A. Facts
Chapman v. Rhodess° was a challenge to the practice of "double cel-
ling" 1 prisoners at a maximum security Southern Ohio Correctional Fa-
cility (SOCF). The prisoner-plaintiffs claimed that the double celling and
its concomitant effects2 2 amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
26. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
28. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
29. 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
30. 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977), afl'd mem., 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
31. Double celing occurs when two inmates are housed in a cell designed for one. Because
"[m]ost national studies of corrections, and virtually all correctional standards, urge or re-
quire that housing be single-cell," most recently constructed prisons are of single cell design.
Singer, The Wolfish Case: Has the Bell Tolled for Prisoner Litigation in the Federal
Courts? in LEGAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 37 (C. Alpert ed. 1980). With the prison population
explosion in the 70's, many single cell facilities were forced to resort to double celling. Thus
the decision in Rhodes v. Chapman is of national magnitude.
32. Prisoner-plaintiffs alleged that the following situations occur as a result of double
celling:
a) that violence and terror, to an impermissible degree, result from such;
b) that the guard and staff level has not been increased, is inadequate to serve the
present population and that the inadequacy has fostered lawlessness and violence;
c) the feeding facilities are overtaxed to the point that the prison population is not
properly fed;
d) the overcrowding has unduly burdened access to the courts;
e) the heating and ventilation systems have been overtaxed to the point of rendering
cell blocks intolerable;
1982]
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The Southern District Court of Ohio found that SOCF was "unques-
tionably a top-flight, first-class facility, '33 and that none of the alleged
effects of double celing were of constitutional magnitude.3 Yet, on the
basis of the proffered evidence, the district court held the double ceiling
at SOCF to be unconstitutional based on the following five factors:35 (1)
the inmates were long term; (2) SOCF was housing thirty-eight percent
more inmates than its design capacity;" (3) expert studies established
fifty to seventy-five square feet per inmates to be the minimally accept-
able standard, but SOCF inmates averaged only thirty to thirty-five
square feet; (4) prisoners at SOCF spent most of their time in their cells;
and (5) double ceiling was not a temporary measure.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling,37 emphasizing that this case did not hold double celling to be un-
constitutional per se, but rather that it was unconstitutional only under
the facts of this case.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed,38 holding that the district
court's findings of fact" and the five factors upon which it based its deci-
sion were "insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. '40 The
f) available medical services are overtaxed; and
g) job opportunities have not kept pace with the population, reducing the rehabilita-
tion process and the same is true of the school and schooling facilities.
434 F. Supp. at 1009.
33. Id.
34. The reduction in the availability of space in the day rooms was "not significant in any
respect;" the food was "adequate in every respect and there [was] no indication whatsoever
that prisoners [had] been underfed or that the food facilities [had] been taxed;" "[tihe ven-
tilation system [was] adequate;" the ratio of guards to inmates was "well within the accept-
able ratio;" no inmate had been denied the opportunity to attend school, although delays in
entering the program were experienced; there was no indifference by the staff to the in-
mates' medical and dental needs; and "there [had] been no increase in violence or criminal
activity increase due to double ceiling; there [had] been due to increased population." Id. at
1012-18. Further, "the defendants [had] not failed to use ordinary care for inmate safety."
Id. at 1020. The Court did find that jobs had been "watered down" and that the number of
psychologists and social workers had not been increased as the population increased, but
these factors were not found to be of constitutional magnitude. Id. at 1015-16.
35. Id. at 1020-21.
36. The "design" or "rated" capacity is the number of inmates the facility is designed to
hold. This number is compared with the actual population to produce an objective index of
overcrowding. The index is often one factor that courts consider when determining the con-
stitutionality of prison conditions and when formulating relief from unconstitutional condi-
tions. See, e.g., Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Or. 1980); Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F.
Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
37. 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980).
38. 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
39. "Virtually every one of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim." Id. at
2399 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. "These general considerations fall far short in themselves or [sic] proving cruel
and unusual punishment. . . ." Id.
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Court, although recognizing that double celling was not the ideal prison
situation, stated:
[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be
free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the
legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no
constitutional violation, the District Court had no authority to consider
whether double celling in light of these considerations was the best response
to the increase in Ohio's state-wide prison population.4 1
B. Standards Set Forth for Eighth Amendment Analysis
Rhodes v. Chapman cannot be read as holding that double celling (or
overcrowding) can never be unconstitutional, for the Supreme Court con-
fined its holding to the facts of the particular case.42 However, the opin-
ion reveals the method by which the Court will analyze future challenges
to prison overcrowding. The reasoning of the Court, therefore, deserves
close scrutiny.
The Court in Rhodes, reiterating that the tests for cruel and unusual
punishment are not static but must evolve with the standards of society,43
set forth the tests to be used in prison conditions cases as follows: "Con-
ditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,
nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime war-
ranting imprisonment."' 4 The Court pointed to Estelle v. Gamble45 and
Hutto v. Finney46 for this proposition, but noted that conditions which do
not result in pain or the deprivation of basic human needs may amount to
cruel and unusual punishment if the conditions violate the contemporary
standards of human decency.
The tests set forth in Rhodes for unconstitutional prison conditions are
virtually identical to the tests used in other cruel and unusual punish-
ment cases.4 7 It is not in the establishment of tests for cruel and unusual
punishment that Rhodes sheds new light on prison overcrowding as being
violative of the eighth amendment but in clarifying the criteria which
must be proved to meet the tests already in use.
41. Id. at 2400-01.
42. "[R]espondents' contention does not lead to the conclusion that double celling at
SOCF is cruel and unusual, whatever may be the situation'in a different case." Id. at 2400
n.14.
43. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
44. 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
45. 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference by staff to inmate's medical or dental
needs constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it resulted in pain with no peno-
logical purpose).
46. 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prison conditions which resulted in deprivation of basic human
needs held unconstitutional).
47. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
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Rhodes tightens the requirements for establishing violations of the
eighth amendment by calling for objective facts and specific evidence to
support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. While the Court recog-
nized the subjective nature of tests used in eighth amendment chal-
lenges,48 it declared that "'judgment[s] should be informed by objective
factors to the maximum extent possible.' ",49 The challenge in Rhodes
failed because there was "no evidence that double celling under these cir-
cumstances either inflict[ed] unnecessary or wanton pain or [was] grossly
disproportionate to the severity of crimes warranting imprisonment," 50
and "no evidence . . .that double celling [was] viewed generally as vio-
lating decency." 51
While the "infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain" and the "pun-
ishment disproportionate to the offense" tests lend themselves to the pro-
duction of specific evidence, they are not often applicable to overcrowding
suits.5' In most of these actions, conditions are challenged as "violating
contemporary standards of human decency." The Court calls for in-
creased evidence in this area, but it focuses on what is not acceptable
evidence, rather than on what evidence will suffice.
The Court rejects the practice of relying on the opinions of experts re-
garding acceptable prison conditions to establish the contemporary stan-
dards of decency.5 3 The practice of relying on standards for minimally
48. "To be sure, 'the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability' of a given punishment." 101 S.
Ct. at 2398 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
49. 101 S. Ct. at 2398-99 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), as cited in
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)).
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2399-2400.
51. Id. at 2400 n.13 (emphasis added).
52. The "infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain" test has most often been used in
cases of denial of medical treatment and excessive use of force by prison guards. When
challenging a denial of medical treatment, the inmate must show deliberate indifference by
the staff to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). If the challenge
is to inadequate medical care throughout the prison system, either a pattern of individual
incidents involving inadequate medical care, or systematic deficiencies in the delivery of
medical care which make unnecessary suffering inevitable must be shown. Ruiz v. Estelle,
503 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D. Tex. 1980). The "punishment disproportionate to the offense" test
was developed in cases involving the trial judge's or prison official's discretionary power in
imposing specific sanctions:
[I]t is particularly inappropriate in evaluating ongoing conditions of confinement for
the general prison population. Challenges to a cumulation of prison conditions that
daily affect the inmate community and that do not include the imposition of extra
punishments following particular transgressions of prison regulations cannot profita-
bly draw on this essentially transactional theory.
Robbins & Buser, supra note 9 at 904. Most cases employing this test have challenged the
imposition of solitary confinement. Id. at 904 n.71.
53. "Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions of experts as to
desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency." 101 S.
Ct. at 2400 n.13. The Court also cites Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (conditions of
[Vol. 16:621628
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acceptable space per inmate, as determined by scientific study or by ex-
perts, 4 has been used by some courts to establish a constitutional mini-
mum of space per inmate.55 Rhodes impliedly overrules these cases where
expert standards were the sole evidence relied on by the court. Other
courts have utilized these standards in formulating relief from over-
crowded conditions.5 6 Expert opinion used in this vein would seem to re-
main acceptable, for the Court in Rhodes recognized that "such opinions
may be helpful and relevant with respect to some questions.'111
Since general expert opinion, absent application to the specific prison
conditions being challenged, will not suffice to establish overcrowded con-
ditions as cruel and unusual punishment, prior cases not relying solely on
expert testimony must be analyzed to determine other types of evidence
which have been held to establish overcrowding as violative of the eighth
amendment.
IV. ESTABLISHING AN OVERCROWDING CASE
A. Overcrowding as a Critical Factor
While it is generally true that no single condition of incarceration rises
to the level of an eighth amendment violation, overcrowding has been
cited by numerous courts as the one factor most responsible for aggravat-
ing existing conditions and producing the most harmful physical and
confinement of pretrial detainees challenged as violative of their due process rights). In Bell
the Court stated that "while the recommendations of these various groups may be instruc-
tive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional minima; rather they
establish goals recommended by the organization in question." Id. at 543-44 n.27.
54. Examples of these standards include AMERIcAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, STAN-
DARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 62 (1976) (60 square feet in a
cell and 75 square feet in a dormitory); COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATON FOR CORRECTIONS,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL IN-
STITUTIONS § 4142 (1977) (60 square feet for inmates spending less than 10 hours in a cell
and 80 square feet for inmates spending 10 or more hours in a cell); NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 53 (1973) (80 square
feet); NATIONAL SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATON, HANDBOOK ON JAIL ARCHITECTURE 63 (1975) (70
square feet); SPECIAL CIVILIAN COMMITTEE, REPORT FOR THE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES
ARiY CONFINEMENT SYSTEM (1970) (55 square feet).
55. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977). In Battle, the court
adopted a standard of 60 square feet per inmate in a cell and 75 square feet per inmate in a
dormitory. "Anything less would be to subject the individual to further punishment than
was given by the sentencing trial court." Id. at 395.
56. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
57. 101 S. Ct. at 2400 n.13. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, agrees that expert opin-
ion cannot be the sole basis for establishing contemporary standards of decency, but recog-
nizes that "such testimony can help the courts to understand the prevailing norms against
which conditions in a particular prison may be evaluated." Id. at 2408 n.12.
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mental consequences. 8 The district court in Pugh v. Locke"9 maintained
that "overcrowding is primarily responsible for and exacerbates all the
other ills of Alabama's penal system," 0 Similarly, in his dissenting opin-
ion in United States v. Bailey,61 Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]here
can be little question that our prisons are badly overcrowded and under-
staffed and that this in large part is the cause of many of the shortcom-
ings of our penal system. '6 2
Two recent Fourth Circuit cases chronicle the effect that prison over-
crowding has upon the other aspects of institutional life. Bolding v. Hols-
houser6s involved a complaint brought by a group of North Carolina
prison inmates, both as individuals and as representatives of all prisoners
similarly situated in North Carolina prisons. The complaint alleged con-
stitutional violations involving overcrowding, interferences with the pris-
oners' mail, various conditions of isolation, failure to provide adequate
food service facilities, and denial of procedural due process at administra-
tive hearings involving parole, transfer, disciplinary action and prisoner
classification.6 The district court denied the plaintiff's request for com-
prehensive injunctive and declaratory relief, holding that the plaintiffs
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision.6 5
The appeals court found that in at least four of their separate causes of
action, the plaintiff prisoners had presented ample facts to support their
claims. This evidences the Fourth Circuit's prior compliance with the
strict evidentiary requirements recently set forth in Rhodes.6  While
heeding the Supreme Court's warning against sweeping injunctions di-
rected at state officials, 67 the Fourth Circuit instead took notice of the
Supreme Court's admonition to the federal courts to remedy constitu-
tional violations occuring in state or federal prisons.
With respect to their claim of overcrowding, the prisoners alleged that
58. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d
461 (4th Cir. 1978); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Or. 1980); Johnson v. Levine, 450
F. Supp. 648 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part and remanded sub noma. Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp.
835 (M.D. Fla. 1975); McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
59. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in part and remanded sub noma. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
60. 406 F. Supp. at 323.
61. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
62. Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. 575 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 462-63.
65. Id. at 464.
66. See notes 48-57 supra and accompanying text.
67. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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as a result of inadequate "personal living space," they were
"victims of and are in constant danger of violent and deadly attack; ...
[they] are victims of and face the persistent danger of rape and other sexual
attack or molestation; ... [and they] suffer accumulating psychological
damage from the high level of mental stress and fear." In addition, plaintiffs
allege that as a result of the overcrowding, they do not receive "adequate
educational, recreational and work-release programs; ... sanitary living
conditions; ... supplies for meeting basic personal hygiene; ... adequate
medical, psychological and dental care; ... visitation rights; ... [and] a
functional classification system ... [to] provide treatment for those indi-
viduals with emotional problems, safety for prisoners in general population,
and means for prisoners to achieve personal improvement.""
It is apparent that most of these allegations parallel those factors which
most commonly appear in prisoners' claims that prison conditions are un-
constitutional. While it has not yet been recognized as such, overcrowding
may emerge, under particular circumstances, as the one factor of institu-
tional life which could rise to such a level as to render the prison condi-
tions unconstitutional.
This proposition is supported by the Fourth Circuit holding in Johnson
v. Levine6 9 that "[o]vercrowding, with all of its consequences can reach
such proportions that the impact of the aggregate effect amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment." 70 In Johnson, prisoners confined in two Mary-
land State penal institutions brought suits alleging that the conditions of
their confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
eighth amendment. The complaints alleged that overcrowded conditions
resulted in double celling, suicides, increased risk of sexual attack, exces-
sive noise levels, increased stress, idleness, and deplorable ventilation
problems.71 Two specific areas of the institutions were singled out as hav-
ing the worst conditions. In one area which housed inmates with psycho-
logical or psychiatric problems, only one official was responsible for the
security and feeding of forty-nine prisoners. In addition, the area had
only one shower,7 2 and some cells had no beds or toilets .7 Another sec-
tion, the six-cell isolation confinement section, housed those inmates who
were considered a threat' to themselves or others.7 4 Inmates in this section
received improper medical attention and were confined in their cells for
68. 575 F.2d at 464.
69. 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978). The Fourth
Circuit in Johnson consolidated two lower court decisions, Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp.
648 (D. Md. 1978), and Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978).
70. 588 F.2d at 1380-81.
71. See generally Comment, Fourth Circuit Review, Prisoners' Rights, 37 WASH. & LxE
L. REv. 371, 532 (1980).
72. 450 F. Supp. at 652.
73. Id. at 657.
74. 455 F. Supp. at 734.
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extended periods of time.75
The district court found that the overcrowded conditions in these insti-
tutions were unconstitutional," a holding which was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit. 7 However, while the district court rejected Maryland's
proposal to eliminate overcrowding,78 the Fourth Circuit remanded the
cases to incorporate Maryland's plan into the decree.75 The proposed plan
involved the construction of a new facility and the early release of some
prisoners.8 The Fourth Circuit considered this proposal reasonable. Only
a new facility could eliminate the unconstitutional conditions and "[w]ith
the elimination of substantial overcrowding, . . .the deficiencies of the
medical facilities, staffs and services will be diminished."81
In Johnson, the "totality of the conditions" approach was again used.
However, all of the substandard conditions were found to be directly re-
lated to the sole condition of overcrowding. So, as with the Bolding analy-
sis, it is suggested that overcrowding is the single critical factor which
aggravates prison conditions to the point at which they are no longer
constitutional.
B. Evidence Needed to Establish Overcrowding as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
In the rare case, the objective facts of overcrowding may be such as to
render the condition unconstitutional per se, as for example, in McCray v.
Sullivan,82 where up to seven men were placed in a six by eight foot cell.
In the majority of overcrowding cases, however, it-is necessary to produce
evidence that the overcrowding has had deleterious effects on the in-
mates, a burden which can be met by showing its psychological and phys-
ical effects on the inmates, or by showing its effects on other prison
conditions.
1. Objective and Specific Evidence
Expert testimony, unrelated to the specific prison facility, that merely
states the effects of overcrowding on prisoners in general, will not estab-
75. Id. at 735.
76. 455 F. Supp. at 734; 450 F. Supp. at 654.
77. 588 F.2d at 1381.
78. 455 F. Supp. at 737; 450 F. Supp. at 661.
79. 588 F.2d at 1381.
80. 455 F. Supp. at 737; 450 F. Supp. at 661.
81. 588 F.2d at 1380.
82. 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1975). In most cases concerning such deplorable overcrowding,
other unconstitutional conditions also exist. In McCray, the cells did not contain bunks or
sinks, and the toilet, which was a hole in the center of the cell floor, produced a waste
backup on the floor of the cell when flushed four times per day.
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lish cruel and unusual punishment under Rhodes.s3 However, such testi-
mony can successfully be used when the expert has inspected the chal-
lenged facility and tested representative inmates. This technique was
used in Capps v. Atiyeh,84 where the testimony of eight expert witnesses,
along with photographic and documentary exhibits, established the over-
crowding to be cruel and unusual punishment. Health risks incident to
overcrowding were shown, 5 as well as its psychological effects."6 General
studies of the effects of overcrowding were introduced into evidence, lead-
ing to the determination that "[t]hese effects are being manifested at
these institutions. 8 7 The court concluded by stating:
The evidence in this case as set forth in the findings of fact is replete with
examples of the deleterious effects of overcrowding on prisoners' mental and
physical health .... It is clear that the plaintiff inmates have been sub-
jected to conditions in which their degeneration is probable and their self-
improvement unlikely. 8
Psychophysiological effects of overcrowding, such as elevated blood
pressures and increased exposure to disease and infection from close con-
finement, were used by the court in Ruiz v. Estelles9 to establish over-
crowding as violative of the eighth amendment.
The court in Anderson v. Redman" found that "[tihe overcrowded liv-
ing conditions directly affect the psychological well-being of the inmates.
Cramped and suffocating quarters increase tension, hostility and aggres-
sion, and exacerbate any personal problems an inmate may have, thereby
intensifying his anxiety and fear."91 The court considered psychological
83. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
84. 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Or. 1980).
85. The increased health risks to which the prisoners were exposed included health
hazards from sleeping on the floor in close contact with the toilets, increased risk of commu-
nication of contagious disease, and gastric illnesses from eating in the noisy, stressful envi-
ronment of a dining room which could seat only 440 inmates, but served 1400 or inore in-
mates at each meal. Id. at 810.
86. The psychological effects of overcrowding included feelings of frustration without op-
portunities to effectively deal with these feelings, retardation of the development of appro-
priate social skills, depression, tension, and suicide attempts. The staff also experienced
shortened tempers and a decrease in tolerance level as a result of the overcrowding, which
increased the friction between the staff and inmates. Id. at 811-12.
87. Id. at 811.
88. Id. at 814.
89. 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Inmates in the Texas Prison System faced ex-
tremely overcrowded conditions. Three to five prisoners were housed in each single cell mea-
suring nine feet by five feet. Two inmates slept on shelf-like bunks, and the remaining ones
slept on the floor between the bars at the front and open toilet at the rear of the cell.
Prisoners assigned to dormitories either slept on mattresses placed on wall ledges, often
above the toilets, or on one of three mattresses placed on two bed frames pushed together.
Id. at 1277-79.
90. 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977).
91. Id. at 1112.
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case histories of individual inmates 2 but primarily based its conclusion
on figures that reflected a disproportionate increase in the number of sui-
cides, suicide attempts, and self-inflicted injuries that occurred in the
overcrowded prison.
A lack of adequate space for exercise was alleged in Clay v. Miller,9 3
but the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case because "there [had] been no
showing that [the challenger's] mental or physical health was threatened
as a result of not being provided more space or facilities."" While this
decision did not involve a direct challenge to overcrowding, it demon-
strates that whenever courts rule on the constitutionality of space limita-
tions, they will henceforth require actual evidence of the deleterious ef-
fects of prison conditions on the inmates.
Evidence of the psychological and physical effects of overcrowding on
inmates is persuasive in establishing overcrowding as violative of the
eighth amendment, but in most cases it is not the only tool available to
the challenger. The majority of prisons with severe overcrowding also ex-
perience a decline in the quality of other prison conditions. Evidence of
this decline has aided many courts in determining that overcrowding con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Effects of Overcrowding on Other Prison Conditions
In recent years courts faced with an eighth amendment challenge to
prison conditions have held that a cumulation of conditions may consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment. Holt v. Sarver"5 initiated this trend
by declaring that "[t]he distinguishing aspects of Arkansas penitentiary
life must be considered together. . . . All [conditions] exist in combina-
tion; each affects the other; and taken together they have a cumulative
impact on the inmates ... ""
Even if the individual prison conditions are not constitutionally imper-
missible, by examining the totality of conditions within the institution,
the court may find that they constitute cruel and unusual punishment.7
92. Id. at 1112 nn.l1 & 12. One representative case history related by the court involved
an inmate with a severe speech problem. He was initially placed in a severely overcrowded
area of the prison, whereupon his stuttering became worse. When he was transferred to an
individual cell, his stuttering ceased, but upon transfer to a dormitory, his stuttering re-
sumed. Id. at 1112 n.11.
93. 626 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 347.
95. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
96. 309 F. Supp. at 373.
97. "Considered separately, these deficiencies would not amount to a deprivation of con-
stitutional magnitude. But weighed in their totality, these conditions at the MHC, all of
which are directly related to overcrowding, result in the deprivation by defendants of rights
guaranteed to plaintiffs by the Eighth Amendment." Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648,
655-56 (D. Md.), aff'd in part and remanded, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978). See also
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The Supreme Court in Rhodes approved this approach by stating that
conditions "alone, or in combination, may deprive inmates of the mini-
mal civilized measure of life's necessities."98
Through the totality of circumstances approach, conditions throughout
the prison may be challenged and their link to the overcrowding estab-
lished. Should the court find a constitutional violation, the remedy it
grants will, at least in part, relieve the overcrowded situation.99 Thus, the
desired relief is obtained by presenting the court with cumulative evi-
dence from which to infer that the prison conditions violate the contem-
porary standards of human decency.
While courts have examined a variety of conditions under the "total-
ity" approach, this comment will focus on seven conditions which have
been challenged in the courts: the lack of a workable classification system,
understaffing, the absence of any meaningful opportunity to participate
in educational or vocational work activities, inmate safety, diet and food
preparation, sanitation, and medical care.
a. Lack of a Workable Classification System
A working classification system within the penal society separates the
young from the old, the strong from the weak, the physically and men-
tally ill from the healthy, and the hardened criminal from the first of-
fender. Understaffing and overcrowding are blamed for the failure to clas-
sify.1°0 Chaos results from this failure.
A breakdown of the classification process has a "snowball" effect - one
bad condition leads to another. In overcrowded prisons, new inmates are
often restricted to already overcrowded quarters and are permitted
neither visitors nor recreation.10 ' Inmates are assigned to institutions,
particular dormitories, and work assignments purely on the basis of avail-
able space. Consequently, there is no isolation of violent inmates, and
weaker inmates are constantly victimized by those who are stronger and
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H. 1977) ("exposure to the cumulative
effect of prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment").
98. 101 S. Ct. at 2407 n.10 (emphasis in original). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
687 (1978) ("We find no error in the court's conclusion that, taken as a whole, conditions in
the isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.") (emphasis added).
99. Courts have relieved the overcrowding in a variety of ways. See Valvano v. Malcolm,
520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975) (limiting prison population to a fixed number); Inmates of Suf-
folk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973) afl'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st
Cir. 1974) (inmates being held in single cells); Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (each inmate allotted a minimum amount of space); Gates v. Collier, 390 F.
Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (closing the prison).
100. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
101. Id. at 324.
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more aggressive.1 0 2 Inmates suffering mental disorders go unidentified
and are dispersed throughout the prison population without medical
treatment. The most disturbed of these inmates should properly be
placed in a penal facility for the criminally insane. Others, suffering vary-
ing degrees of mental retardation, emotional or physical disabilities, need
to be identified and placed in an appropriate environment.10 3
Where there is a breakdown in the classification system, there is no
rational basis on which to assign inmates to any vocational or educational
activities that may exist; 0 4 there are no special programs for or supervi-
sion of the aged and infirm; inmates confined to wheelchairs are left un-
supervised and helpless in the event of an emergency."" All of these con-
ditions, arising in part from a failure to classify, contribute to apathy,
tension, and frustration. "Each of these failings . . . is compounded by
[the] system's most pervasive and most obvious problem: the overcrowd-
ing with which all prisoners must live."10 6
b. Understaffing
Understaffing has a deleterious effect on prison personnel which, in
turn, is felt by the inmates. Communication between guards and inmates
deteriorates, and as the staff becomes more overburdened, their tempers
shorten, and they become less tolerant and more punitive.
01
The problem is aggravated by the fact that the guards, drawn largely
from the local population,' are predominantly nonurban, nonminority
whites, 1 1 while the prison population is primarily composed of urban
blacks and other minorities."0 As a rule, guards are seldom well-educated,
and working conditions and low pay create a lack of job interest. Guards
are often strong, authority-oriented figures, who become more so because
of the nature of their positions. Omnipresent forces divide guards from
inmates and drive them into opposing membership groups, each regard-
ing the other with antagonism and hostility."'
Understaffing often creates situations where inmates are put in posi-
tions of authority and control over other inmates-an atmosphere which
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 325.
106. Id.
107. See Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980).
108. 406 F. Supp. at 325.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Graves & Hill, Prison Conditions and Effects in the Defense of a Prison Crime
Case, 24 AM. JUR. TRIALS 555, 580 (1977) (citation omitted).
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breeds opportunities for blackmail, bribery, and extortion.11 Under these
circumstances, "inmate-guards" are afforded special privileges, "including
freedom to ignore prison regulations and to abuse other inmates."11 This
favoritism increases the tension between guards and inmates and among
the inmates themselves. The polarization of inmates causes a breakdown
in the "inmate code," thus diminishing the aspects of self-protection and
stability inherent in the code.'14 These consequences stem from the in-
ability of too few guards to control the increased number of inmates in
their charge.
c. Opportunity to Participate in Educational or Vocational Work
Activities
Where overcrowded conditions prevail, all vocational, educational, and
rehabilitative efforts by prison officials suffer. The failure of these pro-
grams, if they exist at all, is a direct consequence of overcrowding.
Among the observed effects of high levels of social density (number of
occupants in living quarters) and spatial density (square feet per person)
are increased illness complaint rates, as well as higher death, suicide, and
psychiatric commitment rates.1 25 These effects may be linked to the fact
that most inmates in overcrowded prisons spend a substantial amount of
their time in absolute idleness."' Available educational and rehabilitative
programs are simply inadequate to meet the needs of so many inmates.
Evidence suggests that long periods of idleness destroy any job skills or
work habits which inmates may have had and contribute to their mental
and physical degeneration." 7 According to one expert on penal care, high
levels of overcrowding undermine the initiative to seek self-improvement
and prevent rehabilitation." 8
The failure to adequately classify inmates and the lack of sufficient
personnel only exacerbate the situation. Where there has been no classi-
fying of inmates, the means of identifying an individual inmate's skills,
goals or abilities are lacking. Even where some attempt has been made to
classify, understaffing makes implementing any available programs virtu-
ally impossible. The result again is idleness, which, in turn, results in
"more assaults on inmates and staff; growing numbers of disciplinary re-
112. 406 F. Supp. at 325.
113. Id.
114. Graves & Hill, supra note 111, at 580 (citation omitted). See text accompanying note
126 infra.
115. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAV-
IOR 1-8, (1980).
116. 406 F. Supp. at 326.
117. Id.
118. 495 F. Supp. at 811 (testimony of Dean Morris of the University of Chicago Law
School).
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ports; an increase in inmate defiance, disturbances, and rumors of im-
pending or possible riot; and an overall negative effect on morale." 119
d. Inmate Safety
Prisoners have a constitutional right to be reasonably protected from
constant threats of violence.12 0 While individual lawsuits based upon lack
of adequate protection are entertained by the courts, 21 most actions deal-
ing with inmate safety involve a challenge to the totality of conditions
within the prison.122 Due to the growing public awareness of the preva-
lence of homosexual rape and other forms of violence in penal institu-
tions, courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to the problem of vio-
lence in prisons. The fact that overcrowded institutions are potential
powderkegs which may erupt in riots prompted one court to declare that
"[this court would be remiss in its duties if it did not move to act on the
problems, but rather sat idly by until the increasing crowding caused an-
other major incident to sweep the Oklahoma Prison System.'12 3
To obtain relief from overcrowding, the challenger must first show that
violent incidents are commonplace.22 ' This can be accomplished through
the use of incident reports kept by prison administrators and testimony
119. Id. at 812.
120. As stated in Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972):
[Tihe eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment places a
responsibility upon prison officials to protect the person of inmates within the prison
system from violent assaults by other inmates. Both actual assaults by other inmates
and the constant fear of such assaults add immeasurably to the burden that must be
borne by inmates. If security in a prison reaches such a degree of laxness that assaults
become the rule rather than the exception, then conditions have developed that are
intolerable to accepted notions of decency. In short, there exists a constitutional right
of inmates to be afforded at least some degree of protection from attacks by fellow
inmates.
Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973), established a two-pronged test for
ruling on the constitutionality of these claims. "[Tihe court should ascertain: (1) whether
there is a pervasive risk of harm to inmates . . .and, if so, (2) whether the officials are
exercising reasonable care to prevent ... an unreasonable risk of harm." Id. at 890. See,
e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally, C. Carriere, The Dilemma of Individual Violence in
Prisons, 6 NEw ENGLAND J. PRISoN L. 195 (1980).
121. See, e.g., Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977); Sweet v. South Carolina
Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975).
122. See, e.g., Costella v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd and modi-
fied in part, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), affl'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
123. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977).
124. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part and
remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978) ("an atmosphere in which inmates are compelled to live in constant fear of
violence, in imminent danger to their physical well-being").
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of inmates and prison staff,125 but these methods often fail to reflect accu-
rately the magnitude of prison violence. This inaccuracy results from a
rigid "inmate code," which has as its two cardinal rules: (1) never snitch,
and (2) never notice anything." 6 The Guards also have a code which is
one of protection and includes two maxims: (1) make no waves and (2)
see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil, regarding the conduct of other
guards. 27 Because each group will always take the side of its own mem-
bers and abide by its respective code, instances of violence are often toler-
ated, ignored, and unreported. There is considerable evidence that most
prisoners carry some form of contraband or homemade weapon necessary
for self-protection. 28
Once the fact that violence is a factor of everyday life is established,
the challenger must then show a correlation between the violence and
overcrowding. While some courts have intuitively perceived this link,1 2 9 it
is doubtful that this "common sense reasoning" will be upheld in light of
the call for increasing specificity of evidence set forth in Rhodes.130 Objec-
tive statistics can easily be used to show the causal relationship between
overcrowding and violence, but it is not enough merely to show a propor-
tional increase in violence and population. To prove that overcrowding
causes an increase in violent incidents, it must be shown that the number
of violent incidents increases geometrically with the increase in
population. 131
125. See Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd, 525 F.2d 1239
(5th Cir. 1976). In Capps v. Atiyeh, when presented with evidence that "the reports of ten-
sion at [the prison] were sufficiently convincing that members of the Parole Board were
motivated... to move their meetings to a site outside [the prison] for fear they would be
taken hostage in the event of a disturbance," the court had little difficulty in determining
that violence was a pervasive problem. 495 F. Supp. 802, 812 n.15 (D. Or. 1980).
126. Graves & Hill, supra note 111, at 580 (citing Merklin, Prison and the Concrete
Mind; 2 CENTER MAGAZINE 90, 91 (1969)).
127. Graves & Hill, supra note 111, at 581.
128. 406 F. Supp. at 325. Shakedowns to remove weapons from the prison population are
neither thorough nor often enough to significantly reduce the number of weapons. "There
are too few guards to prevent outbreaks of violence, or even to stop those which occur." Id.
Among prison populations it may be concluded:
The extent to which oppressive discipline, guard brutality and enforced sexuality
contribute to the general milieu of violence in prisons may be the subject of discus-
sion and debate. There is no question, however, that prisons are places of excessive
violence, that this violence level is much greater than that in the general society, and
that the recognition of this fact by guards and inmates alike-through constant fear,
apprehension and tension-affects the conduct of all, causing them to carry their re-
actions on a hair trigger.
Graves & Hill, supra note 111, at 598 (citatons omitted).
129. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1286-87 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
130. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
131. The Court in Rhodes approved of the district court's finding that "[r]espondents
[had] failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater vio-
lence" because "the court found that the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased
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e. Diet and Food Preparation
While a bread and water diet has been declared per se unconstitu-
tional, 32 challenges to the quality and quantity of food served or the con-
ditions of its preparation have never been held violative of the eighth
amendment in suits based solely on these grounds; however, many courts
have considered these factors in "totality of conditions" suits.
A prison is required to provide enough food of nutritional value to cre-
ate a healthy diet. 33 To establish evidence of the inadequacy of a prison
diet, a dietician may review the caloric and nutritional value of the stan-
dard fare and compare this with the requirements of an average in-
mate.134 While an inadequate diet is merely one factor in the totality of
conditions, unless it can be causally linked to overcrowding, the relief
granted will be an improvement in the food offered rather than a relief
from overcrowding. 3 5
Unsanitary conditions of food preparation may be evidenced by ver-
min-filled food, 36 unsanitary dishwashing procedures,137 inadequate food
storage"" or filthy and debris-strewn kitchen facilities.3 " An inspection
by a representative of the State Department of Health will provide evi-
dence of unsanitary conditions."10 Again, a causal connection between the
with the prison population, but only in proportion to the increase in population." 101 S. Ct.
at 2396.
132. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
133. See Feazell v. Augusta County Jail, 401 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Va. 1975); Cassidy v.
Superintendent of City Prison Farm, 392 F. Supp. 330 (W.D. Va. 1975).
134. See Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980) in which the court stated:
Dietitians called by both plaintiffs and the defendants testified that this diet was
calorically and nutritionally inadequate. Plaintiffs' expert testified that an average-
sized sedentary person on this diet could be expected to lose nine pounds per month,
and he described the health hazards associated with diets, such as this one, that con-
tain insufficient amounts of vitamin C and calcium. The defendants' expert agreed
that the diet was inadequate in these respects.
Id. at 508. See also Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
135. See Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980) (court ordered addition of
specific food items to standard prison fare).
136. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Cf. Lovern v. Cox, 374 F.
Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1974) (occasional presence of objects in food does not raise question of
cruel and unusual punishment).
137. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
138. Id. at 323.
139. Id. See Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
140. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980). While a state health code does
not establish constitutional minima, violations of the code, coupled with the inspector's
statement that "the food service represents imminent danger to the health and well-being of
the inmates consuming food in that operation," prompted the court in Ramos to find the
kitchen facilities "'grossly inadequate and constitutionally impermissible.'" Id. at 571-72
(quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 155 (D. Colo. 1979)).
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overcrowding and unsanitary food preparation must be established in or-
der to obtain the desired relief from overcrowding. One method used to
establish this connection is to show that because of the large number of
inmates for whom food has to be prepared, and because of the lack of
sufficiently trained food service personnel the food must be handled by
untrained inmates. 14 1 In this situation, a court may conclude that relief
from overcrowding would remedy the unsanitary food preparation.
f. Sanitation
Because health may be endangered by unsanitary conditions, the prison
administration is required to make reasonable efforts to keep the facility
in a state of repair. 42 Evidence of leaking roofs, insect infestation, stag-
nant air and excessive mold and fungus growth as a result of inadequate
ventilation, and leaking pipes and defective plumbing causing sewage to
accumulate in cells and service areas, led one court to declare that
"[w]ithout doubt, the State's inability to meet minimal shelter and sani-
tation standards contributes immeasurably in making the main living ar-
eas unfit for human habitation."' 4 Sanitation, therefore, can have an in-
fluence on the court in determining whether the totality of conditions
violates contemporary standards of human decency.
Unsanitary conditions may be shown by photographs, testimony of staff
and inmates, and inspections of the facilities by health inspectors. Objec-
tive data, such as one functioning toilet for over 200 inmates, 44 may also
be utilized. A persuasive technique in this area is for the court to inspect
the facilities. This provides for verificaton of the evidence presented and
resolution of any conflicting testimony.245
The prison administration must also provide inmates with supplies for
routine health care and cleanliness. While an inmate who chooses not to
clean his cell has no grounds to complain, inmates who wish to clean their
cells must be provided with enough cleaning supplies to do an adequate
job."4 6 Inmates must also be provided with toiletries for personal hygiene.
At a minimum soap, towels and toilet paper must be provided,"17 but
some courts have extended this list to include toothpaste, toothbrushes,
shampoo, shaving cream, razors, and combs."4
141. 406 F. Supp. at 323.
142. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Wright v. McMann, 321
F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
143. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 570 (10th Cir. 1980).
144. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
145. See Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732, 741 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
146. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 570 (10th Cir. 1980).
147. See Scellato v. Department of Corrections, 438 F. Supp. 1206 (W.D. Va.), dismissed,
565 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1977) (failure to provide toiletries other than soap, towels, and toilet
paper not deprivation of constitutional dimension).
148. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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g. Medical Care
The medical facilities and treatment within a prison may themselves be
deemed unconstitutional upon proof of "deliberate indifference to a pris-
oner's serious illness or injury.1141
Often, the existing medical staff and facilities150 are not adequate for an
increasing prison population, yet there is no deliberate indifference to the
inmates' needs. 15' When faced with this situation, courts are placed in a
precarious position. The medical care offered does not fail the "deliberate
indifference" test of unconstitutionality, yet it fails to meet the needs of
the inmates. One solution to this dilemma is for the court to declare the
totality of the conditions unconstitutional and remedy the overcrowding,
thereby relieving the strain on the medical facilities and treatment. This
approach was used by the Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. Levine,' 2 where
the court found prison overcrowding to be unconstitutional by consider-
ing the effects that an increased population had on a number of prison
conditions. It declined to rule on a complaint that "medical care itself
149. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). See also Newman v. Alabama, 349 F.
Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 948 (1975), which is replete with examples of indifference to inmates' medical needs. A
quadraplegic inmate with maggot infested bedsores had the dressing changed only once in
the month prior to his death; a stroke victim's leg had to be amputated due to lack of
circulation because he was forced to sit on a wooden bench during the day so he would not
soil his bed. 349 F. Supp. at 285.
150. A lack of funds to procure new staff or construct new facilities is not a defense to
unconstitutional prison conditions. "The problems of administering prisons within constitu-
tional standards are indeed 'complex and intractable' . . . but at their core is a lack of
resources allocated to prisons." Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (1981) (Brennan,
J., concurring). Compliance with constitutional standards cost the Louisiana prison system
$105,605,000 for capital outlays, and required a supplemental appropriation for a single year
of $18,431,622. Id.
Plans to build new facilities and anticipated increased funding may be considered in fash-
ioning an appropriate remedy for unconstitutional conditions. "[T]he developments in the
construction of the new prison facilities are extremely relevant in fashioning an appropriate
remedy for the constitutional violations . . . ." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 586 (10th
Cir. 1980). Contra, Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1281 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("[The] evi-
dence makes it clear that [the Department of Corrections'] construction plans ... promise
little hope in the foreseeable future of significant relief from the overcrowding which perme-
ates Texas prisons.").
151. Inmates are less likely to receive proper medical care in overcrowded prisons. The
Oregon State Penitentiary, which houses approximately fifteen hundred inmates, has only
one medical officer, a private physician, who spends only one to one and one-half hours per
day at the prison. Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980). One nationally
recognized expert in penal health care testified that, in order to properly minister to the
needs of such a large institution, two full-time physicians would be necessary. Id. His con-
clusion was shared by another physician who testified that the administering of psycho-
tropic drugs by the institution's infirmary in the absence of a physician was extremely dan-
gerous to the health of the inmates. Id.
152. 588 F.2d -1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
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was constitutionally deficient, 1 5 3 stating that "[w]ith the elimination of
substantial overcrowding . .. the deficiencies of the medical facilities,
staffs and services will be diminished."' 5"
To obtain the desired relief of a reduction in the prison population, a
link between overcrowding and the decline in medical care must be estab-
lished. In cases involving the number of medical staff,' 55 availability of
hospital beds,15 or delay in receiving treatment, 157 the causal relation is
apparent upon a recitation of the specific facts of the case. In cases in-
volving less obvious effects, or requiring medical knowledge, the chal-
lenger can introduce expert testimony.'5 8 In one case, the court appointed
a physician as a special master.' 59 When the quality of medical care is a
factor, case histories have been used effectively. 60
Inmates in need of medical care have no alternative but to depend on
that provided by the prison authorities. While courts are quick to detect
frivolous claims, a justified challenge to the adequacy of medical treat-
ment and facilities will be weighed by the court in determining the con-
stitutionality of the prison conditions.
153. Id. at 1381.
154. Id. at 1380.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Carson, 401
F. Supp. 835, 876-77 (M.D. Fla. 1975). Risks to inmate health were found in Anderson v.
Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977). The risks were due in large part to the fact that
the hospital area had to be used for regular housing, thus leaving no area for quarantine of
contagious inmates. Specific case histories were presented to the court. An inmate with an
active and highly contagious strep condition was not quarantined; when an outbreak of
scabbies occurred throughout a tier of the prison, inmates were quarantined in their cells;
an inmate who was suspected by the medical staff of having active tuberculosis was left in
the general population, but was moved to the hospital upon confirmation that he had the
disease. Id. at 1118.
157. A delay in receiving treatment may violate the eighth amendment where the serious-
ness of the injury is apparent. See Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).
158. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
159. See Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), afl'd and modified in
part, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976). The court appointed a physician with a master's degree
in hospital administration:
(1) to serve in his professional medical capacity as expert special master of this Court
,. . by organizing, directing and conducting a comprehensive health services survey
of all correctional institutions and road camps maintained and operated by the Divi-
sion of Corrections; (2) to report his findings to the Court on the entire spectrum of
health care services rendered to the inmates in custody of the Division of Corrections;
and to report ... those remedial measures, if any, which were medically necessary to
insure a minimally necessary medical program and system of health care to the in-
mates committed to the custody of the Division of Corrections.
397 F. Supp. at 23.
160. See note 149 supra.
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V. CAN OVERCROWDING BE USED As A DEFENSE?
In 1950, "[tlhe law [was] well settled that intolerable living conditions
in a prison afford no justification for escape."' 61 Since that time, judicial
attitudes have changed. Many courts in recent years have had to decide
whether the common law defenses of necessity and duress"6 2 are available
to prisoners who have escaped from confinement.'13 The inmates contend
that intolerable conditions create either a justification or an excuse for
the escape."" Under certain circumstances, contemporary courts will al-
low such defenses to exonerate the inmate.
In a 1974 case, People v. Lovercamp,6 5 the California Court of Appeals
held that a limited defense of necessity was available if the following five
conditions existed:
(1) the prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual
attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) there is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a
history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints
illusory;
(3) there is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) there is no evidence of force or violence used toward prison personnel
or other "innocent" person in the escape; and
(5) the prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he
has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat. 66
While Lovercamp received wide acclaim,' 67 commentators have pointed
out that its strict requirements, such as the necessity for a specific threat
in the immediate future and the insistence that the threatened prisoner
complain first to prison authorities, unduly hampered the defense and
161. See State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, -, 72 A.2d 442, 443-44 (1950).
162. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 356-88 (1972).
163. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape From Prison - A Step
Toward Incarceration Free From Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 111 (1975). See
generally Note, Have the Prison Doors Been Opened?-Duress and Necessity as Defenses
to Prison Escape, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 913 (1978); Comment, Prison Escape and Defenses
Based on Conditions: A Theory of Social Preference, 67 CALn. L. REv. 1183 (1979); Com-
ment, Intolerable Conditions As a Defense to Prison Escapes, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 1126
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Intolerable Conditions]. See also United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394 (1980); People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974); People
v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); People v. Harmon, 394 Mich. 625, 232
N.W.2d 187 (1975); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975).
164. See generally Intolerable Conditions, supra note 163; Sturc, Conditions Confine-
ment: The Constitutional Limits on the Treatment of Prisoners, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 42
(1975).
165. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115-16 (1974). See generally Note,
Criminal Law-Availability of the Duress Defense in Prison Escapes: People v. Lover-
camp, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1102 (1976).
166. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
167. See note 163 supra.
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represented an unrealistic view of the prisoner's actual situation.16 8 More
recent decisions evidence a relaxation of the Lovercamp conditions. 6 9
In 1978, the D.C. Circuit Court, in United States v. Bailey,'70 emphati-
cally stated that evidence of intolerable conditions was admissible regard-
less of whether the Lovercamp prerequisites were met. The court stated:
We find no adequate justification for this special broad proscription against
admission of such probative defense evidence relating to intent. Juries are
accustomed to determining the intent of alleged criminals, and we see noth-
ing in the context of prosecutions for escape that requires the court to risk
denying the defendants a fair trial by denying the jury its normal
function.'17
While the Supreme Court overruled the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the
inmate convictions,17 2 its holding was based on the fact that the inmates
involved in the escape had failed to support their defenses of necessity
and duress. The Court found that a necessary element of such defenses
was a showing of a "bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as
soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.
173
Since the respondents had failed to introduce sufficient evidence of this
element of their defense, the judgment of the appeals court was re-
versed.174 The Supreme Court, however, did not comment on the coercive
conditions of confinement which led the respondents to escape. The in-
mates had escaped to avoid such conditions as poor ventilation, beatings
and threats of death by prison guards, and inadequate medical attention.
There was apparently no evidence of "back-to-the-wall situations' 7 5 or
prior attempts to contact prison officials before escaping. Bailey appears
to indicate a further relaxation of the Lovercamp requirements and a
more realistic judicial approach to the actual conditions of prison life.
VI. OVERCROWDING IN VIRGINIA: OUTLOOK FOR THE EIGHTIES
Due to the "serious overcrowding in [Virginia's penal] institutions, and
a backlog of state inmates in local jails," 76 a number of overcrowding and
"totality of conditions" suits can be expected from Virginia's inmates in
the 1980's. One such suit was recently resolved prior to trial through a
168. See Intolerable Conditions, supra note 163, at 1141-45 & nn.91-112.
169. See, e.g., State v. Horn, 58 Hawaii 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1977); People v. Unger, 66 Ill.
2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975).
170. 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
171. Id. at 1095-96. See generally Note, The Necessity Defense to Prison Escape After
United States v. Bailey, 65 VA. L. REV. 359 (1979).
172. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
173. Id. at 415.
174. Id. at 417.
175. 585 F.2d at 1117 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (empahsis in original).
176. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS OPTIONS
FOR THE EIGHTIEs-EXEcuTIWE SUMARY 11 (1978).
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consent decree, which in part provided relief from overcrowding.7 The
Department of Corrections is well aware of the situation in Virginia's
prisons and has made both short and long range plans to combat the
overcrowding problem.17 However, because of the rapidly increasing in-
mate population, these plans have not yet begun to solve the
overcrowding 79
Prison condition suits filed in the Fourth Circuit have been subjected
to the specific evidence requirements of Rhodes. s0 While cases within the
circuit have found overcrowding to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment, s" the Fourth Circuit has declined to hold double celing to be un-
constitutional per se182 and has declined to establish "square foot per in-
mate standards" of constitutionality. Because the Fourth Circuit has been
deciding prison condition suits according to the Rhodes standards, the
decision in Rhodes will not necessitate a change in the Fourth Circuit's
approach to these suits.
In Virginia, suits by local sheriffs to compel the Department of Correc-
tions to relieve the overcrowding in local jails by accepting prisoners sen-
tenced to state institutions may provide the first opportunity for the state
courts to apply the specificity of evidence requirements of Rhodes. These
suits are based on a Virginia statute which states that "[e]very person
sentenced by a court to confinement in the State penal system shall, as
soon as space is available and transportation capabilities permit, be con-
veyed to the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections
... "I"' The argument is made by the department that, due to this stat-
ute, it has no duty to accept new inmates unless space is available. The
sheriffs must therefore argue that this statute cannot be held to compel
177. Cagle v. Hutto, No. 79-0515-R (E.D. Va., consent decree filed Feb. 12, 1981). The
consent decree provides in part that the population of each dormitory will be limited to a
maximum of fifty inmates, and each new inmate will be housed in a single occupancy cell for
a minimum of sixty days.
178. For the interim "emergency actions," such as converting a warehouse to dormitory
space, see Landon, The Corrections Funnel and Adult Inmate Population Growth in Vir-
ginia, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTIONS
OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION 101 (1978). Long range plans are detailed in
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS OPTIONS FOR THE
EIGHTIES (1978) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS OPTIONS]; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONs,
CONTINUING AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WITH ACTION PLAN TIMETABLE: 1980-1987 (1980).
179. "[W]e in corrections have not been able to expand rapidly enough to accommodate
these ever increasing numbers of individuals being funneled into our incarceration re-
sources." Landon, supra note 178, at 101.
180. See Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378
(4th Cir. 1978).
181. See Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378
(4th Cir. 1978).
182. Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1977).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-21.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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local jails to confine inmates under unconstitutional conditions.28 In or-
der for this argument to be effective, the sheriffs must demonstrate that,
due to the backlogging, the overcrowded conditions of their jails amount
to cruel and unusual punishment. The specificity of evidence require-
ments of Rhodes must be met to make this showing.
One such "sheriff case" is presently on appeal to the Virginia Supreme
Court.185 At the trial, the sheriff testified that the overcrowding in his jail
caused by the department's failure to accept sentenced inmates resulted
in inadequate hospital 86 and food preparation facilities,187 and that sleep-
ing more than seventy prisoners on the floor in dayroom areas caused
security problems.88 The circuit court held that the jail "[was] presently
overcrowded and in a dangerous condition, partly due to the actions of
[the department],"18 9 and ordered the department to accept the sen-
tenced prisoners. If the Virginia Supreme Court rules on the constitution-
ality of the conditions in the jail,19 0 it is doubtful, in light of the eviden-
tiary requirements of Rhodes, that the conditions will be deemed cruel
and unusual punishment. Testimony by a sheriff bf the effects of over-
crowding does not provide the objective and specific evidence called for in
Rhodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a growing awareness of the conditions of confinement in Amer-
ican prisons and an evolving acceptance of the fact that intolerable condi-
tions of incarceration can rise to the level of unconstitutionality. It has
also been acknowledged that overcrowding is by far the greatest contrib-
uting factor to such conditions. Until prison populations can be reduced
to manageable levels, incidences of illness, violence, frustration, and es-
cape will only increase. Overpopulation creates the very conditions of
confinement which the courts are increasingly recognizing as legitimate
grounds for raising the affirmative defenses of necessity and duress. Pris-
184. The sheriff is powerless to remedy overcrowding in his jail. He cannot release those
confined nor refuse to accept arrestees from law enforcement officials. The Department of
Corrections has options available to temporarily relieve overcrowding. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-
19.17 (Repl. Vol. 1978) allows it to transfer inmates to institutions with available space. It
can also release an increased number of inmates on parole. See CoRMCTIONS OPTIONS, supra
note 178, at 17.
185. Huggins v. Hutto, No. 71-838 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct., June 17, 1981), appeal dock-
eted, No. 81-1655 (Va., Oct. 2, 1981).
186. Record at 10, Huggins v. Hutto, No. 81-1655 (Va., Oct. 2, 1981).
187. Record at 29.
188. Record at 37.
189. Huggins v. Hutto, No. 71-838, slip op. at 15 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct., June 17, 1981).
190. If the Virginia Supreme Court holds that the Department of Corrections had availa-
ble space, yet did not accept the sentenced inmates, it will then decide the case on the basis
of noncompliance with the statute and will not reach the question of the constitutionality of
the jail conditions.
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oners may soon find that a sufficient showing of overcrowding will sup-
port their defenses.
Rhodes v. Chapman establishes a bifurcated analysis for challenges to
the constitutionality of prison conditions. The first step consists of a de-
termination of the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the existence of
these conditions. The evidence offered in this regard must be objective
and specific. Then, if the evidence is deemed sufficient, the court can ap-
ply the traditional tests for cruel and unusual punishment.
This new evidentiary requirement in eighth amendment analysis will
prevent courts from finding conditions unconstitutional based solely on
expert opinion. However, should unconstitutional conditions in fact exist,
the required evidence will be available. In overcrowding suits, where the
increased inmate population amounts to cruel and unusual punishment,
effects of the overcrowding on the mental and physical health of the in-
mates and on the totality of prison conditions can be established by ob-
jective and specific evidence.
Rhodes cannot, therefore, be seen as a retreat by the judiciary from
involvement in prison condition suits, but rather as a delineation of the
evidence which must be produced prior to the courts' application of tests
for cruel and unusual punishment.
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